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QUEENSLAND 
On his ascension to the premiership in Decem-
ber 1987, Mike Ahern signalled a fresh start for 
Queensland — a vision of excellence, with a 
promise of quality in public administration and 
public life. By the beginning of 1989, however, 
little of that vision had been realised. Indeed 
Premier Ahem appeared beleaguered. His 
National Party colleagues were fighting in pub-
lic, opinion polls put Labor in a position to win 
at the election due before the end of the year 
and Queenslanders waited, with considerable 
anticipation, for Mr Tony Fitzgerald to deliver 
his official report on corruption, due on 4 July. 
From his first day in office Ahern had been 
attacked by his predecessor. Sir Joh Bjelke-
Peterson never forgave Ahern for his role in 
removing Queensland's longest serving premier. 
Sir Joh amused himself during 1988 by pre-
dicting doom for the Ahern-led Nationals. By 
January 1989 those prophecies appeared ever 
more plausible. Sir Joh turned 78 on Friday, 13 
January, and in a series of staged events during 
the coming month sought to undermine his suc-
cessor. The Bjelke-Peterson family helped in the 
venture, son John describing the National Party 
without his father as "a sinking ship without any 
direction". 
Deposed leaders tend to bitterness, but Sir 
Joh's interventions remained important because 
his criticism of Ahem's leadership accurately 
captured much concern within the National 
Party. Opinion poll data showed the State ALP, 
led by Wayne Goss, posing a real threat to 
National Party dominance. The Liberal Party 
too, under new leader Angus hums, claimed a 
revival in its support. By February some 
National MPs were hinting at a challenge to 
Ahem's leadership, probably from high-profile 
Police Minister Russell Cooper. Though Cooper 
dutifully scoffed at media reports, the theme of 
government disunity remained dominant for 
much of 1989. 
Ahem worked hard to overcome his 
government's problems. The Premier appeared 
almost incessantly on radio and television to 
defend his policies and his ministers. He flew to 
London to promote Queensland, and returned 
talking of new contacts for local companies. 
Following time-honoured Queensland political 
tradition, Ahern then attacked the federal 
government — over housing policy and interest 
rates, over child poverty, and over intervention 
in local environmental decisions. An expensive 
advertising campaign, paid for by taxpayers, 
reinforced the government's message. 
"Queensland leads the Way" announced full 
page newspaper advertisements, as a smiling 
Mike Ahem pointed to charts proclaiming Aus-
tralia's fastest growing economy, lowest taxes, 
record growth and best future. 
Yet despite his considerable efforts. Ahern 
failed to persuade. Two factors combined to 
frustrate this familiar parochial appeal to 
Queensland sensibilities — the damage done by 
the Fitzgerald Inquiry, and continuing disunity 
within the National Party. 
Fitzgerald Inquiry 
Most public hearings for the Fitzgerald Inquiry 
were completed in 1988; from February 1989 
Commissioner Fitzgerald withdrew to contem-
plate his report. After a year of revelations, 
however, corruption had been established as the 
only real issue in Queensland politics, crowding 
out older economic and State rights concerns. 
Ahern proved unable to reshape the agenda. For 
despite Fitzgerald's absence, events conspired to 
keep the police, the judiciary and dishonest 
politicians in the news. 
The Queensland police force had not 
enjoyed 1988. Its most senior officer, Commis-
sioner Terry Lewis, had been stood down and 
now awaited legislation to remove him from 
office. A large number of police had admitted 
corruption in the witness stand, and many more 
were under internal investigation for misconduct 
(some 200 officers, said Justice Minister Paul 
Clauson in June). Several further incidents, 
therefore, did little for morale. On 19 March 
Queenslanders learned that police in 
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Toowoomba for a football competition had 
rampaged through a local hotel, abusing 
customers, wrecking fittings and refusing to pay 
for drinks. A subsequent investigation made 
little headway, provoking accusations that 
police had again closed ranks to protect their 
own. It seemed, despite Fitzgerald, little had 
changed in the force — an impression rein-
forced a month later with allegations that offi-
cers were operating a sly grog shop and disco 
from their police station on Thursday Island. 
Meanwhile, the saga of former Transport 
minister Don Lane kept corruption in the public 
eye. In late 1988 Lane admitted misappropria-
ting ministerial expenses — and implicated 
fourteen other former and serving ministers in 
the practice. Lane did not resign immediately 
from Parliament, provoking a concerted media 
campaign about the morality of a confessed dis-
honest politician continuing to draw on the pub-
lic payroll. Finally Lane bowed out at the end of 
January, collecting a superannuation payout of 
around $535,000. Opposition leader Goss 
refused to sign the authorisation until Lane 
returned misused public money, but the Premier 
and Speaker combined to provide the necessary 
two signatures. Lane withdrew, his superannua-
tion intact, to await charges from Fitzgerald 
Special Prosecutor Doug Drummond QC. 
The resignation left Premier Ahern with an 
unwanted by-election in a Brisbane seat held 
only narrowly by the Nationals in the 1986 
general election. A strange cast of candidates 
soon appeared, many reinforcing the message 
that corruption was the only real issue — a for-
mer policeman turned whistleblower, a one-time 
nightclub owner named in the terms of reference 
for the Fitzgerald Inquiry and of course Liberal 
and Labor candidates both talking of little but 
scandal. Though National Party candidate, car 
salesperson Betty Byrne-Henderson, bravely 
campaigned on the slogan "Send a Message to 
Canberra", the voters of Merthyr proved more 
concerned about Queensland issues. At the 13 
May by-election the National Party vote col-
lapsed to just fifteen per cent, leaving the 
Liberals to win the seat from Labor in a close 
contest. Merthyr, muttered some National Party 
figures, was a foretaste of the defeat to come if 
Ahem remained leader. 
Thus corruption, and the impending 
Fitzgerald findings, hung over the government 
all through the opening months of 1989. Accu-
sations of misconduct continued to surface —
against Primary Industries Minister Neville 
Harper over administration of a drought-relief 
scheme, and against two senior judicial figures, 
Justices Vasta and Pratt. Vasta was eventually  
dismissed from office by a special parliamen-
tary sitting on 7 June. Former Premier Bjelke-
Peterson told the Parliamentary Judges Com-
mission of Inquiry that he had appointed Pratt to 
the bench believing him to be, "like all sensible 
people", "a National Party supporter". The 
Commission, however, found no evidence of 
wrong doing against Justice Pratt. While the 
judge was acquitted, many waited nervously to 
see who would be implicated when Fitzgerald 
delivered the report which Premier Ahem had 
promised to implement "lock, stock and barrel". 
National Party Disunity 
Disunity had stalked the National Party since 
Bjelke-Peterson was pushed from office. Ahern 
talked of reconciliation, but tension remained 
between his supporters and those of the former 
premier. A reshuffle in January created more 
problems than it solved when Ahern chose to 
swap several portfolios rather than dismiss some 
lesser performing ministers. The move won lit-
tle support within the party or the press. One 
backbencher was widely quoted as saying that if 
Ahern "thinks this is the right team to lead us 
into the next election then maybe we should be 
thinking about another leader". 
The subsequent dismissal of Health Minister 
Leisha Harvey only exacerbated the problem. 
Ahern appeared to procrastinate before sacking 
the much criticised Harvey, who immediately 
threatened to resign and precipitate a by-elec-
tion in her marginal Brisbane seat of 
Greenslopes. Harvey eventually withdrew to the 
backbench, another potential supporter for any 
move against the Premier. 
In part continuing disunity reflected an 
internal argument about the direction of the 
National Party. Sir Joh had exemplified a rural 
party and philosophy while the younger, tertiary 
educated Ahern sought a more progressive 
image. Persuading the party room to follow his 
lead sometimes proved difficult. In February, 
for example, Ahem backed down from a 
recently announced policy that ministers could 
not accept gifts — a trivial incident, but 
characteristic of both Cabinet's unwillingness to 
accept change to established practice, and of 
Ahern's apparent indecisiveness when faced 
with opposition. A more serious challenge 
emerged in June when Speaker Lin Powell, an 
unreconstructed Bjelke-Peterson supporter, 
announced he could no longer remain in a party 
with Ahern as leader. Powell chose as his issue 
a recent decision allowing the re-employment of 
teachers with minor drug convictions, but the 




between Ahem and more conservative elements 
of the National Party. Powell's resignation 
renewed speculation about a leadership chal-
lenge. Ahern survived into the parliamentary 
winter recess, but his hold on the top office 
appeared uncertain. 
The Labor Opposition 
Oppositions do not win elections, says a truism 
of politics, governments lose them. Throughout 
the first months of 1989 political debate centred 
almost exclusively on the troubled Nationals. 
Yet given Queensland's zonal electoral system, 
and three-way electoral contests, Labor had few 
guarantees that government losses would be 
Opposition gains. 
To ensure his party remained in the public 
eye, Labor leader Wayne Goss appeared to 
follow a two-part strategy. On the one hand, 
Labor sought to reinforce the image of a corrupt 
National Party administration. MPs attacked 
government advertising campaigns (costing $9.5 
million in the previous financial year), and criti-
cised the government over controversial issues 
such as the Wolffdene dam, coastal develop-
ment and foreign investment. 
In one heated exchange Goss and deputy 
leader Tom Bums were ejected form Parliament 
in March for interjecting during question time. 
Yet the Opposition did not wish just to oppose. 
The second part of Labor strategy emphasised 
the party as a viable alternative government. 
Election advertisements, which began back in 
late 1988, talked of Wayne Goss and Labor as 
"The Only Change for the Better". A string of 
detailed policy papers — on regional develop-
ment, housing, coastal development and tourism 
among others — all stressed responsible eco-
nomic management and efficient, honest 
administration. Despite opinion polls running in 
Labor's favour, however, few believed in 
inevitable ALP victory at the forthcoming elec-
tion, generally expected in December. Through-
out 1989 the Goss team presented a disciplined 
and professional message, but one discounted 
by a media and electorate unable or unwilling to 
believe that Labor could finally, after thirty-two 
years, overcome the electoral system and win 
office. 
The Liberal Party 
Both Labor and Liberal tacticians hoped their 
party would be the prime beneficiary of a 
National collapse. The Liberals had some cause 
for optimism — strong support at the 1988 
Brisbane City Council elections, good polling at 
the federal level, a reasonably high profile for 
Angus limes and an experienced new State 
Director of the Queensland Liberal Party, David 
Fraser, a former adviser to Prime Minister 
Malcolm Fraser. Liberal election campaigning 
started early and followed a consistent theme: 
"Let's Put It Right" said the first newspaper 
advertisements in March. Inns talked of a 
Liberal resurgence, though Premier Ahern 
declared on several occasions that the Nationals 
would never return to coalition. 
Yet two factors cast shadows over Liberal 
hopes. One was guilt by association — the 
Liberals were part of the government for much 
of the period investigated by Fitzgerald, though 
limes had not been a minister during the coali-
tion years. More important, however, was the 
political difficulty of establishing a viable 
middle position. Sitting on the cross-benches, 
the Liberals had to attack an unpopular govern-
ment without encouraging the electorate to vote 
for the Opposition. In many seats, Liberal suc-
cess would rely on the preferences of National 
Party voters. Should government support col-
lapse completely, particularly in the crucial 
south-east zone, then Labor may win seats 
which should otherwise be comfortable Liberal 
gains. The Merthyr by-election, though a 
Liberal win, epitomised the problem. In what 
had long been a reasonably secure conservative 
electorate, the poor showing for the Nationals 
nearly delivered Merthyr to Labor candidate 
Barbara Dawson. Nineteen eighty-nine, then, 
promised both historic prospects and consider-
able risks for the Liberal Party in Queensland. 
A Fortieth Birthday 
While political parties manoeuvred for position, 
an important player in Queensland politics cele-
brated a fortieth birthday. The zonal electoral 
system had been introduced by the Hanlon 
Labor government on 1 April 1949, and modi-
fied by successive National/Liberal and 
National Party governments. Opponents labelled 
the system a "gerrymander" (or, at least, a 
malapportionment) while defenders talked of 
"balanced regional political representation". 
There was little argument, however, about the 
effect of the system. Weighting country votes, 
and cordoning-off provincial city areas from 
their hinterlands, reduced the electoral impact of 
urban votes and so maximised National Party 
representation. A redistribution in 1985, which 
retained four separate weightings for elec-
torates, enabled Bjelke-Peterson to retain power 
with just 36.9 per cent of the primary vote. Now 
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parties pondered how the electoral system might 
influence the 1989 result. 
The zonal system has not been a topic of 
lasting controversy in Queensland, despite its 
obvious disadvantage for the Labor and Liberal 
parties. During 1989, however, the 'Citizens for 
Democracy' pressure group promoted success-
fully the issue of electoral fairness. CND had 
campaigned, somewhat sporadically, for a num-
ber of years with little noticeable effect. The 
Fitzgerald Inquiry provided an unexpected 
opportunity for more lasting impact. In its sub-
mission to Fitzgerald, CND asserted a direct 
link between electoral and political corruption; a 
government protected from full accountability, 
it argued, has little incentive to remain honest. 
Similar positions were expressed in a number of 
submissions, including that of the Labor Party. 
Now, in the weeks before the Fitzgerald Report 
was presented to the government, rumours 
spread that the Commission was taking the 
electoral argument seriously, and would make 
recommendations on the issue. As CND organi-
sers cut the cake at a party called to mark the 
zonal system's fortieth birthday, they must have 
wondered whether their point of view was about 
to prevail. 
The Politicians We Deserve 
By July 1989, Queensland politics was a drama 
awaiting resolution. The Fitzgerald Report was 
about to arrive. An election was looming. The 
National Party appeared divided, speculation 
continued about the future of the Premier, and 
Labor and Liberal election campaigns were 
already underway. Yet how much these theatri-
cals touched on the lives of ordinary Queens-
landers remains a mystery. A federal parlia-
mentary report, released in March, found 
"remarkable" ignorance and apathy about Aus-
tralian politics. When a reporter from Brisbane's 
Courier-Mail (10 March 1989) interviewed stu-
dents at the University of Queensland about 
state politics, a similarly disturbing pattern 
emerged. Though the sample was small, and the 
method doubtful, the poll found that those who 
see themselves as tomorrow's leaders "don't 
know much about today's". Clearly neither a 
vision of excellence, nor the promise of respon-
sible alternative policies, had made much 
impact with at least some of the electorate. 
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